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BY SAMUEL IssACHAROFF,
PAMELA

s. KARLAN

AND RICHARD

The[following essay is exce~ted and
adapted from The Law of Demo~racy:
Leg~l Strµcture of the Political Process,
©The Fo ndation Press, Inc., Westbury,
NY (1998). Publication is by permission.

Constitutions are often viewed today
as constraints on majoritarian power in
the service of minority interests. But
constitutional ground rules also create
the possibility of ongoing democratic
self-government; constitutions establish
relatively stable and non-negotiable
precommitments that enable generally
accepted structures of political
competition to emerge and endure.
Despite the centrality of this role for
the American Constitution, however,
there is paradoxically little that the text
or its history offers in the way of directly
relevant guidance. In part, this results
from the great silences of the
Constitution regarding the structure of
electoral politics - a silence that often
reflects America'.s peculiar federal
structure, in which so much regarding
the ground rules of political competition
was left to be settled at the state level.
Thus, neither the original Constitution
nor the Fourteenth Amendment secured
even the basic right to vote.
In its original form, the Constitution
contained scant mention of voting. The
only organ of the national government
that was elected directly was the House
of Representatives, and Article I, section
2, clause 1 provided simply that "The
House of Representatives shall be
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composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several
States, and the Electors in each State
shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature." Thus, the
entitlement to vote in the only popular
federal election was entirely dependent
on a state's grant of the franchise, and all
states limited the right to vote to only a
subset of the population. The most
widespread limitations involved age, sex,
race, property ownership, and length of
residence within the jurisdiction, but
there were others as well. Nonetheless,
the franchise was extended more widely
among white males than in any other
country at the time. In a series of
nineteenth century cases, the Supreme
Court reiterated that "the Constitution of
the United States has not conferred the
right of suffrage upon any one" [United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555
(1875)1. And yet, since the Civil War, a
majority of the ratified constitutional
amendments have dealt in whole or in
part with voting and they have marked a
consistent expansion of the franchise.
Not only has voting come to occupy a
more prominent place in the written
Constitution; it has also come to be
treated by the Supreme Court as a
central, and fundamental, right of
citizenship.
As with the right to vote, the
Constitution is also silent about much
else regarding the structure of democratic
politics. The text does speak in quite
general terms about the terms of federal
elected officials and even more generally
about qualifications for election. But in
addition to voting rights, the
Constitution also does not explicitly

address most other important issues
regarding elections - from how ballots
are to be cast, to the electoral system for
all public offices save the president and
Senate, to issues of how elections are to
be run and financed, and so forth.
The failure of the Constitution to offer
much specific guidance also reflects the
premodern world of democratic practice
and the long-since rejected assumptions
of that world on which the Constitution
rests. Most important for present
purposes, the Constitutional structure
was specifically intended to preclude the
rise of political parties, which were
considered the quintessential form of
"faction." Yet political parties have long
become the principal organizational form
through which mass democracy can be
mobilized and effectively pursued. No
constitutional framework for enabling
modern democratic self-government can
neglect the role of political parties, yet
the Constitution not only is silent about
parties, it was designed to preclude their
emergence. Similarly, the original
Constitution reflected a particularly elite
conception of democratic politics, one in
which, as author Gordon Wood puts it in

The Radicalism of the American Revolution
(1992), the leading history of the period,
"Madison hoped that the new federal
government might restore some aspect of
monarchy that had been lost in the
Revolution." But this more aristocratic
conception of democracy was already
being displaced by the 1790s, and was
utterly supplanted as early as the
Jacksonian era - developments that led
virtually all the Framers who lived that
long to a pervasive but underappreciated

pessimism because, democracy had fallen
"into the hands of the young ana
ignorant and needy part of the
community," Wood writes. This
transformation in the conception of
democracy eventually culminates in
certain structural changes, such as the
Seventeenth Amendments shift to direct
senatorial elections, and the various
franchises-expanding amendments. But
these changes are layered onto a
document and set of institutional
structures that reflected the premodern
vision of democratic politics. For
example, while voting for public
officeholders was the quintessential
attribute of representative government,
the act of voting quickly changed its
social meaning and significance from
what the Framers originally envisioned.
Initially, the open ballot played the role
of ratifying social and political
hierarchies; as another important
historian, Robert H. Wiebe, notes in
Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American
Democracy (1995), "leaders still assumed
political office as their right and
instructed the people as their duty. "
Elections focused on personal qualities,
not political issues; a striking example
was that in the elections to the Virginia
Ratifying Convention for the Constitution,
many districts would elect their two
leading men - even though they held
opposing opinions on whether the
Constitution should be embraced.
Already by the early 19th century,
though, the open ballot had come to
symbolize a kind of political equality and

independent choice of citizens, with
genuine sovereign power, that had not
been originally contemplated in the
election-as-ratification conception.
With respect to democratic politics,
then, the American Constitution is a
curious amalgam of textual silences,
archaic assumptions that subsequent
developments quickly undermined, and
a small number of narrowly targeted
more recent amendments that reflect
more modern conceptions of politics.
Particularly in this arena of democratic
institutional design, the American
Constitution reveals its age. More
modern constitutions invariably devote
considerable space to the institutional
framework for politics and tend to reflect
the structures now associated with
democracy, such as political parties.
In light of this history, American
courts facing contemporary questions of
democratic principles today often have to
construct a conception of democracy
with less textual and historical
foundation than in some other areas of
constitutional law. Yet the pressure on
courts to do so is great, given the selfinterest existing powerholders have in
manipulating the ground rules of
democracy in furtherance of their own
partisan, ideological, and personal
interests. Throughout [this book], we
will see the problems facing the Supreme
Court as it struggles to work out a
democratic theory of the Constitution to
deal with numerous specific issues. To
what extent should the Constitutions
premodern assumptions preclude the
Court from taking on this task itself? To
what extent do those assumptions
instead require that the Court assume
this role?
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